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NEPAL: DANGEROUS PLANS FOR VILLAGE MILITIAS 
I. OVERVIEW 
The Government of Nepal is creating local civilian 
militias – known as Rural Volunteer Security Groups 
and Peace Committees – in what risks becoming an 
alarming escalation of its conflict with Maoist rebels. 
Civilian militias are likely to become an untrained, 
unaccountable and undisciplined armed force that 
worsens a conflict that has already taken almost 
9,000 lives. The scheme is controversial, and the 
government has publicly denied that it has already 
started distributing weapons despite evidence that it 
is indeed going ahead. 
If implemented, village militias are likely to have 
serious and long-term consequences: 
 Their creation would force many villagers to 
take sides in the conflict – something most 
wish to avoid since it makes them targets for 
violence from both sides and tears the already 
worn social fabric, leaving lasting damage.  
 Militias are likely to receive only minimal 
training, have little oversight and few controls, 
thus leading to a worsening of human rights 
problems. Massacres, abductions and illegal 
imprisonments are already rife in Nepal, and 
these problems will get worse. 
 Arming untrained villagers when regular 
police forces are often under-armed and 
under-trained is counter-productive. 
 Disarming and demobilising militias after 
conflicts is extremely difficult. Eight years 
after such forces were demobilised in 
Guatemala, many are still active as criminal 
groups. 
 Militias tend to mutate. A number of terrorist 
networks have their origins in government-
linked militias or underground groups including 
al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and 
Turkish Hizbollah. Given Nepal’s complex 
ethnic and social landscape, creating new 
armed movements is particularly ill-advised. 
On 4 February 2004 one of the villages where local 
people had been armed, Sudama, was attacked by a 
large number of Maoists. ICG visited the village 
while researching this briefing, and a detailed 
description of its situation is given below. Although 
the attack was repelled without any reported injuries 
to civilians, it appears that the village was targeted 
because of its reputation as a pilot location for the 
militia program. This emphasises concerns that 
arming civilians is likely to lead to increased violence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Conflict between the security forces and Maoists, 
who launched their armed insurgency in February 
1996, has become increasingly violent. Following 
the Maoists’ decision to withdraw from the seven-
month ceasefire in August 2003, the rate of killings 
– the large majority by the state security forces, 
especially the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) – has 
increased significantly.1 
The conflict traces its origins well back in time and 
to a complex mix of social, economic and political 
 
 
1 According to preliminary figures released by the 
Kathmandu-based Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), 
deaths on all sides from 1996 through January 2004 totalled 
8,826. During a press conference on 15 January 2004 RNA 
spokesman Colonel Deepak Gurung stated that up to 1,400 
Maoists, 177 members of the police forces and 111 army 
personnel had been killed since the ceasefire ended on 27 
August 2003. These figures indicate a significant escalation 
of the conflict in recent months. In the period from the start 
of the Maoist insurgency to the palace coup of 4 October 
2002, per day killings by the Maoists and the state averaged 
2.43; from 4 October 2002 to 30 January 2004, the average 
was 6.38; since the collapse of the second ceasefire on 28 
August 2003, the rate has reached 12.20 (according to 
INSEC’s data). In the latest period, 1,340 people were killed 
by the state and 515 by the Maoists. 
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problems in the Kingdom. Poverty and a very weak 
government, a lack of efforts to redress caste and 
ethnic problems, a stalled transition from autocratic 
to democratic rule and a tumultuous period of 
political instability have all contributed to an 
environment in which the Maoists have flourished.2 
Both sides have carried out acts of extreme 
violence, and human rights abuses have been 
common across the country as increasingly civilians 
are the main victims of the conflict. 
The political situation has become much more 
volatile in recent months. The most visible element 
is a determined student protest movement that now 
extends across the country to all its larger urban 
centres. Student protests have been common in 
Kathmandu, and there have been serious clashes 
with the RNA. Media attention has focused closely 
on the street violence. While there is little prospect 
of a political solution at the moment, most analysts 
believe that neither the Maoists nor the RNA can 
win through military means.  
III. THE CREATION OF MILITIAS 
Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa announced 
plans to arm villagers to “help defend against 
Maoists” in November 2003.3 The scheme was 
included as a component of a unified command that 
would merge all armed and law-enforcement forces 
and give them “special powers”. Military sources 
indicated to ICG that the government would arm 
former servicemen and their families first and then 
extend the experiment to the rest of the population. 
The decision to arm civilians follows a broadening 
of the conflict by the Maoists. In October 2003 ICG 
noted expanded recruitment by the insurgents in 
eastern Nepal and the Tarai.4 Neither the RNA nor 
the Maoists have been able to defend all their 
territory to date. Large swathes of the countryside 
are controlled by one side or the other more or less 
by default. On the government side, this territorial 
weakness has been compounded by a centralised 
command concept under which security forces have 
 
 
2 See ICG Asia Report No50. Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire 
or Strategic Pause?, 10 April 2003. 
3 Prime Minister Thapa unveiled the plan at a press 
conference in Kathmandu on 4 November 2003.  
4 See ICG Asia Briefing, Nepal: Back to the Gun, 22 October 
2003. 
been withdrawn from scattered outposts and 
consolidated into one or two large bases per district. 
By December 2003 RNA weapons had been 
distributed in Sudama, a village in the eastern Tarai 
district of Sarlahi some 125 kilometres from 
Kathmandu. The village, which has a population of 
about 5,000, is just four kilometres north of the 
border with the Indian state of Bihar. Sudama’s 
population – predominantly higher caste Rajputs 
and Tarai Brahmans and lower caste Dalits – is 
representative of Nepal’s Tarai plains. Sudama was 
an ideal village from the government’s point of 
view in which to start the militia experiment 
because it is home to a large number of serving and 
retired police personnel and their families. It 
became prominent in 2003 when villagers foiled a 
Maoist attempt to kidnap the son of a local leader. 
Twelve-bore shotguns and twenty rounds of 
ammunition had already been distributed to ten 
residents of Sudama in October 2003 in the presence 
of the RNA’s eastern division commander.5 The 
RNA subsequently provided a week of training to 
seventeen villagers in a nearby police station. Three 
groups of villagers, always including one of the 
armed men, were formed to patrol the village at 
night. 
The presence of the guns, however, produced fears 
of an increased risk of Maoist attacks. The 
insurgents have frequently raided the RNA and the 
police to steal weapons, and the villagers believed 
the guns made them an attractive target. “It would 
have been better if the security services had set up a 
base in the village to provide us with security”, said 
a community leader.6 According to the government, 
the weapons were subsequently withdrawn from 
Sudama. However, a very senior RNA officer 
explained that they are taken out of the village each 
morning but are redistributed at night. Recent 
research in Sudama indicates that weapons are 
indeed still in circulation. 
On the night of 4 February 2004, some 60 to 70 
Maoists attacked Sudama, targeting the house of 
the former Village Development Committee 
Chairman. Villagers returned fire, and RNA 
reinforcements arrived one hour later to repulse the 
attack. An RNA spokesman argued that this attack 
demonstrated the need to arm villagers so they 
 
 
5 ICG interview, Sudama, 27 December 2003. 
6 ICG interview, Sudama, 27 December 2003. 
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could respond to Maoist attacks more effectively.7 
However, he was at the same time reluctant to 
confirm the extent to which the villagers had been 
given weapons or indeed even whether the RNA 
had received explicit orders from the government 
about arming the local people.  
The formation of a different type of militia, 
composed of captured and allegedly reformed 
Maoists, has received less media attention, but 
reports quote RNA commanders as confirming they 
have co-opted at least 39 Maoists into a “village 
security force” to fight their former comrades.8 
Military sources maintain these militias also are 
unarmed. 
The greatest factor galvanising support for the 
Maoists and alienating the public from the 
government has been the RNA’s widespread use of 
indiscriminate violence.9 As the government has 
been unable to control its official forces, it seems 
unreasonable to expect it to retain control of 
informal forces, making their mutation into 
criminal groups highly likely.10 An increase in 
violent human rights abuses would almost certainly 
risk a reduction in external aid, which already 
accounts for 40 per cent of the national budget. 
If larger numbers are recruited into the militias, the 
result is likely to be harmful also for the already 
weakened, labour-intensive rural economy, while 
increased fighting could be expected to drive more 
refugees into Kathmandu and across the border into 
India.11  
The arming of civilian groups also raises the spectre 
of ethnic conflict. Since the state has either not been 
present in, or has recently withdrawn from, much of 
the countryside, there are insufficient mechanisms 
with which to resolve disputes. Few people have 
access to the judicial system, and most regard it as 
irredeemably corrupt. Without effective mechanisms 
for settling disputes peacefully and with new 
capacity to engage in deadly violence, disillusioned, 
 
 
7 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 5 February 2004. 
8 “Surrendered Maoists re-deployed in Nepal village security 
forces”, Rajdhani, 20 December 2003. 
9 See ICG Asia Report No50, Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire 
– Soft Landing or Strategic Pause?, 10 April 2003. 
10 In October 2003, ICG noted increasing reports of 
violence, including harassment of NGOs, not for political 
reasons but for extortion. See ICG Briefing, Nepal: Back to 
the Gun, op. cit. 
11 Ibid. 
disenfranchised villagers may begin turning weapons 
on each other during their frequent disputes over land 
and water or the caste feuds and ethnic strife that 
occur in most villages. In the longer term, the 
nation’s already strained ethnic tapestry could tear 
either along RNA/Maoist lines or in a more complex 
manifestation of the inequalities in Nepalese society.12 
IV. GOVERNMENT ARGUMENTS 
Political leaders from the Nepali Congress and 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist 
Leninist) have called for an immediate end to the 
militia program, citing many of the reasons outlined 
above.13 Some members of the donor community 
have voiced strong reservations in private. While 
King Gyanendra has not publicly expressed an 
opinion, Prime Minister Thapa’s government has 
offered assurances to its critics that the program is 
only in the planning stages and/or that while it is 
being implemented, no arms are being distributed. 
The government has established a committee to 
consider the implementation of the proposed 
program. This committee has already reported to the 
Prime Minister but the contents have not been 
published nor has the government made a public 
statement on its current policy towards militias. 
Despite suggestions that the program might be 
quietly withdrawn, a number of ministers have 
privately confirmed that it is already under way.14 
In justification of the policy, government officials 
typically point to Guatemala, Peru and India as 
examples of countries that have successfully used 
village defence forces to defeat insurgencies. These 
examples are worth reviewing in more detail. 
Between them, they illustrate the range of problems 
that can result from the use of unaccountable militia 
forces. 
 
 
12 For further information on Nepal’s ethnic, religious and 
cultural divisions, see ICG Asia Report No57, Nepal: 
Obstacles to Peace, 17 June 2003. It details the increasingly 
forceful assertion of religious and cultural identities by 
Nepal’s more than 60 caste and ethnic groups and the 
disproportionate access to justice enjoyed by the minority 
Bahun-Chhetri and Newar groups. 
13 Kantipur, 3 January 2004. 
14 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 9 November 2003. 
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A. GUATEMALA 
Voluntary Civilian Self-Defence Committees or 
Civilian Self Defence Patrols (PAC, after the Spanish 
acronym)15 were an integral part of the protracted 
conflict in Guatemala in the 1980s and 1990s. PACs 
expanded greatly under General Rios Montt, who 
took power following a 1982 coup. They were 
comprised of rural indigenous males essentially 
drafted into a supposedly voluntary local security 
service. Armed and violent, they were a major source 
of insecurity throughout the country for over a 
decade.16 Violations and atrocities directly attributed 
to the PACs included massacres of women, children 
and the elderly,17 as well as abductions, rapes, threats, 
illegal tax collection and robberies. The national 
legal system did not halt the depredations, essentially 
because those committing them were both the 
creation of and protected by the armed forces.18 
PACs are also credited with having destroyed the 
social fabric of indigenous populations in 
Guatemala by forcing villagers to spy on each 
other and fostering mistrust among formerly 
peaceful clansmen; increasing discrimination 
against indigenous people; and causing economic 
deprivation by forcing citizens into patrols and 
away from their productive work. The PACs often 
included child soldiers because families sent boys 
to fight rather than the heads of household.19 
The groups have proved to be a persistent problem. 
In October 2003, eight years after PACs were 
formally disbanded, former members took hostages 
in the town of Libertad to demand the government 
pay them salaries for their work in the 1980s.20 In 
December 2003 the UN responded positively to a 
 
 
15 Patrullas de autodefensa civil or comites voluntaries de 
autodefensa. 
16 “Fourth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Guatemala”, Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, 1993, chapter vi, para. 1. Full report available at 
www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Guatemala93eng/chapter.6
.htm. 
17 “Report of the United Nations Secretary General on Civil 
Defence Forces”, submitted to the Commission on Human 
Rights, Fiftieth Session, Item 11(a), para. 14. 
18 Written statement submitted by human rights advocates to 
the Commission on Human Rights, Fiftieth Session, Agenda 
Item 11, “Relationship between civil defence forces and human 
rights violations – the situation in Guatemala”, para. 11. 
19 Ibid., paras. 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17. 
20 “Cuatro Periodistas de Prensa Libre rehenes de ex PAC 
demandan pago del Gobierno”, Prensalibre.com 27 October 
2003. 
request from the government to establish a 
Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups 
and Clandestine Security Organisations in Guatemala 
(CICIACS) to help end the threat to stability from 
their reappearance .21 
B. PERU 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 4,732 self-
defence committees (rondas campesinas) were 
created in Peru to protect against terrorism, 
particularly of the Shining Path, and ostensibly 
against drug trafficking. By 1993 these committees, 
armed and controlled by the military and security 
forces, were active in all the major conflict areas.22 
They operated with complete impunity, often killing 
peasants and unarmed civilians whose alleged links 
with the Shining Path guerrillas were not confirmed. 
Subsequently, they have been tied to numerous 
extrajudicial mass executions.23 
Several studies of these committees describe them as 
contributing to the spiral of violence in Peru, even if 
aimed initially as a response to the Shining Path.24 
The Peruvian army was more successful in tackling 
the insurgents in the southern Andean regions of 
Puno and Provincias Altas of Cuzco when the 
military command adopted strategies that were 
specifically aimed at protecting civilians rather than 
targeting them as potential Shining Path. There were 
also no rondas in this area unlike further north in the 
country around Apurimac and Ayacucho where 
violence continued for many years.  
C. INDIA 
Village Defence Committees have had prominent 
roles assisting security forces in Jammu and 
Kashmir since their creation in 1998.25 The 
 
 
21 “Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
Government of Guatemala for the Establishment of a 
Commission for the Investigation of Illegal Groups and 
Clandestine Security Organizations in Guatemala 
(CICIACS)”, signed 7 January 2004. Text available at 
www.un.org/News/dh/guatemala/ciciacs-eng.pdf. 
22 “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions Following his Mission to 
Peru”, 1993. 
23 “Report of the United Nations Secretary General”, op. cit. 
24 “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru”, Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 1993. 
25 “J&K Gov’t Creates 42 New Village Defence Committees”, 
The Statesman (India), 6 October 1998. 
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program is a good example of the significant 
danger posed to civilians by groups without proper 
military or logistical support. Several villages 
appear to have been targeted by insurgents because 
of the presence of weak militias, resulting in the 
deaths of scores of civilians.26 The situation has 
been exacerbated because the committees lack 
suitable armament, relying mostly on cast-off 
Indian Army .303 rifles.27 
Since the mid-1990s, Indian security forces have 
also been using a second type of militia in Jammu 
and Kashmir: surrendered and captured militants 
who operate as a state-sponsored counter-
insurgency “renegade” force, the best known being 
Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon (Muslim Brotherhood). Their 
unofficial status permits them to carry out brutal 
operations with which the government would not 
wish to be associated. Their record includes grave 
human rights abuses, executions, disappearances, 
torture and illegal detentions.28 
The Indian government also used state-sponsored 
militias during the 1986-1996 conflict with the 
Khalistan separatist movement in Punjab.29 The 
former Director General of the Punjab police, Julio 
Ribeiro, has since discredited the policy he was 
charged with implementing: 
[The militia’s] demands grew to an extent 
where it was impossible to satisfy them within 
our resources. Besides, they were very greedy 
people, with a criminal tendency, who began 
to prey on law-abiding, rich citizens on the 
assumption that the police were indebted to 
them and so would do nothing to stop them. 30 
 
 
26 “Militants Kill 19 in Doda, Poonch”, The Statesman 
(India), 21 July 1999; “Eight Members of Village Defence 
Force Killed By Militants”, BBC Monitoring, 2 August 2000; 
“Kashmir Militants Kill Five Village Defence Committee 
Members”, BBC Monitoring, 7 January 2002. 
27 “Ultras’ Guns for Village Guards”, The Statesman (India), 
7 August 1999. 
28 “Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security 
Forces and Militant Groups Continue”, Human Rights Watch, 
1999, available at www.hrw.org/reports/1999/Kashmir/ 
militias.htm. 
29 R. Narayan Kumar and A. Singh, “Reduced to Ashes: The 
Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab”, South Asia 
Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu, 2003, p. 105. Full 
report available at www. punjabjustice.org. 
30 J. Ribeiro, Bullet for Bullet: My Life as a Police Officer 
(Penguin Books, 1998), p. 349. 
Another senior Indian police official cautioned that 
such a policy is unlikely to work unless the groups 
are closely supervised, and there is a parallel 
political strategy.31 Importantly, he noted that Indian 
village militias were not established as an alternative 
to regular police but were accompanied by a 
strengthened presence of police posts and personnel. 
In Nepal, however, there do not appear to be parallel 
plans to re-establish police posts that have been 
withdrawn during the conflict or to increase the 
presence of other security forces alongside village 
militias. 
D. OTHERS 
While uncontrolled and unaccountable civilian 
militias have often worsened civil wars and delayed 
the establishment of peace, some have presented 
more complex dangers by mutating into terrorist 
organisations. Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia had its 
origins in various Islamic movements including some 
supported by the former Suharto government in 
Jakarta to counter the communist party.32 Turkish 
Hizbollah, a group once used by Ankara in its fight 
against the Kurdish PKK, has been linked to recent 
bombings of Jewish and British targets in Istanbul.33 
Al-Qaeda itself emerged from the international 
mujahidin groups sponsored by Western and Arab 
countries to fight against Soviet troops and the Soviet-
backed government in Afghanistan. Once unleashed, 
these organisations have proved very difficult to 
control. 
V. RESPONSES 
Reacting to news that the RNA had helped to set up 
militias in Chulachuli village of Ilam district, the 
largest circulation Nepali language daily, Kantipur, 
published a hard-hitting editorial on 24 December 
2003: 
 
 
31 ICG interview with former Punjab police chief K.P.S. 
Gill, 16 December 2003.  
32 See ICG Asia Report N°43, Indonesia Backgrounder: 
How The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, 11 
December 2002; ICG Asia Report N°63, Jemaah Islamiyah 
in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, 26 
August 2003. 
33 “Istanbul bombing suspects handed over to terror court”, 
The Independent, 25 November 2003. 
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Self-defence is a good thing. But the damage 
done by arming civilians against armed rebels 
who are fighting against the state can be 
avoided if the unintended consequences of 
such programs are seriously thought out in 
time. Rather than distribute weapons now and 
regret it later, steps should be taken after a 
careful consideration of the consequences. If 
what the human rights groups are saying about 
the village and town defence committees is 
true, then the government must immediately 
stop the program to arm civilians. 
The editorial’s conclusion was unequivocal:  
If well trained servicemen themselves 
sometimes lose control when provided with 
guns, how can we expect little trained, poor, 
pessimistic villagers to remain under control 
when armed with guns? This will only take 
society towards more criminalisation, and the 
innocent will always have to live under the 
shadow of the gun. 
Many donors are already concerned at the proposals 
for creating local militias although little information 
on their implementation has so far reached 
Kathmandu. “Of course we totally oppose this plan 
of arming villagers, but we had no idea it is actually 
being implemented in some villages already”, a 
European diplomat based in Kathmandu told ICG.  
The U.S. embassy in Kathmandu released an 
official statement saying:  
The U.S. mission is not providing either 
material or moral support to the Village 
Defence Force concept. Our information on 
this plan remains limited and inconsistent, 
possibly reflecting a lack of finality in 
Government of Nepal thinking. While people 
everywhere have a basic right to self-
defence, any such concept organised by a 
government should conform to recognised 
international standards, respect human rights, 
be well organised, and include a well-
developed training component.34 
Indeed, across the board, international officials 
remain frustrated by the confusion surrounding the 
government’s handling of the Village Defence Forces 
 
 
34 Statement from the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu to ICG 
14 February 2004. 
issue, and the government’s often contradictory 
statements regarding the militias has only heightened 
concerns about their ability to carry out any such 
plans within the norms of international human rights 
standards. 
In December 2003, a senior European diplomat 
spoke to ICG on the subject: “While weapons 
might be part of the solution to bring Maoists to 
the negotiation table, arming villagers is a recipe 
for disaster, and despite warning, the RNA has just 
announced it will implement it in two villages in 
the Tarai where allegedly local people have been 
able to ‘repel’ Maoists”.35  
An official of an international NGO in Kathmandu 
was similarly concerned: “Of course distributing 
weapons to the people is a very dangerous step – 
you let the genie out of the bottle and cannot put it 
back”.36 When the plans were first announced, 
Amnesty International wrote to Prime Minister 
Thapa to express grave concerns at the possible 
consequences of arming civilians and drawing them 
further into the conflict. It noted that, “without 
appropriate supervision, training and clearly defined 
mechanisms for accountability, there is a clear risk 
that the creation of these groups could lead to an 
increase in human rights violations carried out with 
impunity”.37 
Although there are legitimate security concerns, 
civilian militias are not the best way to tackle the 
Maoist insurgency. Donors should caution the 
Nepalese government against arming civilians. 
Governments that support the RNA, in particular the 
UK, the U.S. and India, should insist that it become 
more accountable to the Nepalese people and respect 
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.38 The 
 
 
35 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 7 December 2003. 
36 ICG interview, Kathmandu, November 2003. 
37 “Nepal: Civilians sucked into ongoing conflict”, Amnesty 
International Press Release 11 November 2003 (ASA 
31/072/2003). 
38 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions states:  
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound 
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms 
and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be 
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded 
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. 
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government should not in effect subcontract some of 
its security responsibilities to hard-to-control and 
poorly trained militias.39 
In order to achieve these objectives and end the 
culture of impunity that has encouraged human 
rights abuses and so alienated many Nepalese from 
their government, donors should work to expand 
civilian and judicial oversight of the armed forces. 
Essential components of such a strategy include 
support for:  
 human rights education programs for the 
security forces; 
 expanded civil society monitoring and 
mechanisms for improved civilian oversight 
of the security forces; 
 better access for the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
                                                                                    
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which 
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the 
Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring 
into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the 
other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect 
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.” 
39 UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/67 on 
Civil Defence Forces spells out standards pertaining to the 
creation of such forces and recommends the following: “(a) 
Civil defence forces shall only be deployed for the purpose of 
self-defence; (b) Recruitment into them shall be voluntary and 
shall be effectively controlled by public authorities; (c) Public 
authorities shall supervise their training, arming, discipline 
and operations; (d) Commanders shall have clear 
responsibility for their activities; (e) Civil defence forces and 
their commanders shall be clearly accountable for their 
activities; (f) Offences involving human rights violations by 
such forces shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the civilian 
courts”. Of course, the Maoists are also obliged to abide by 
the Geneva Conventions or risk future prosecution for war 
crimes.  
 pressure on political and military leaders to 
establish accountability within the security 
forces; and 
 the Nepal National Human Rights 
Commission’s call for UN experts to assess 
human rights abuses by both sides in the 
conflict.40 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 17 February 2004
 
 
40 For more details, see Amnesty International release on 20 
November 2003 Nepal: “Escalating reports of human rights 
violations must be examined by United Nations experts” at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/ index/engasa310832003. 
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